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As many people  have commented,  the critical  legal  studies  movement is
the heir to the tradition of legal  realism.'  Conventionally, one distinguishes
between  two branches of legal  realism:  one branch called "rule-skepticism"
and another  called  "fact-skepticism." 2  Rule-skepticism  claimed  that, in  a
reasonably  well developed  system of legal rules, talented lawyers could pro-
duce arguments,  resting on accepted premises of the system, that supported
both  a  result  and  its opposite,  and that those arguments  would  satisfy  any
demands  that  might  be  made  for  internal  coherence  or  consistency  with
prior decisions.  Fact-skepticism  claimed  that it was impossible  for an ana-
lyst, be it a judge, jury, or legal sociologist,  to recapture  what had happened
in the  past  in sufficient  detail to  allow  confident  decisions about  what  had
happened  or  what  ought  to happen  in  the  future.  Using  a  case  study  in
criminal  procedure,  this  article  will  identify  two  strands  of  critical  legal
thought that we  regard  as the descendants  of these branches.
In Part  I we develop  the critique  of all versions of legal formalism,  which
we consider to be the descendant of rule-skepticism.  We define legal  formal-
ism  as  the  position  which  claims  that results  in  any particular  case  are in
some nontrivial sense determined  by a  set of general  principles.3  This Part
discusses four types of legal formalism.  Each is a formalism in that it claims
that results follow  from general  principles, but the types differ in the nature
of the  principles  they  espouse.  (1) Classical  doctrinal  formalism draws  the
principles  from  rules  of law  as  announced  in  controlling  legal  documents
such  as  the  precedents  relevant  to the  problem  at hand.  For example,  a
•  Professor  of Law,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center.
•* Instructor  in  Law,  University of Miami  Law School.
1.  See, e.g.,  Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics,  and the Critical  Legal Scholars:  The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN.  L.  REV.  199  (1984).
2.  See J.  FRANK,  LAW  AND THE  MODERN  MIND  x-xi  (6th printing  1949).
3.  See  Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note  1, at  206-07.Catholic University Law Review
doctrinal  formalist  may claim that a  lawyer-like examination of the  Consti-
tution and  the  precedents  requires  that  a  conviction  be  affirmed.  (2)  The
formalism of moral  philosophy draws  its principles  from some relatively  sys-
tematic  discussion  of fundamental  principles  of morality.  For  example,  a
moral philosophical  formalist may argue that appropriate  principles of pun-
ishment require that a conviction be affirmed.  (3)  The formalism of law and
economics draws  its  principles  from  what  it claims  are  the  logical  conse-
quences  of assumptions  about human  rationality  and  strategic  behavior  in
situations  where  resources  are not unlimited.  For example, a  law  and  eco-
nomics formalist  may argue  that the efficient allocation  of prosecutorial  re-
sources  requires  that  a  conviction  be  affirmed.  (4)  The  formalism  of the
sociology of  professions draws  its principles  from a systematic observation  of
the behavior  of participants  in the  legal  system.  For example,  a  legal  soci-
ologist may argue that the demands for performance placed on  prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges make it entirely understandable  that a convic-
tion  will  be affirmed.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes4  is  used  here  as  the  framework  for  examining
these formalisms.  The case involved Paul Hayes,  who was indicted for pass-
ing a bad check  for $88.30.  Over a decade earlier  he had  been convicted of
committing  a sexual  assault, and he had committed  a robbery  several years
before his bad check indictment.  These prior felonies made Hayes subject to
the  state's  habitual  criminal  statute,  which  imposed  a mandatory  life sen-
tence  on  third-time  felons.'  The  prosecutor  offered  to  recommend  a  five-
year sentence if Hayes pleaded guilty  to the indictment.  Otherwise, he said,
he would  ask the grand jury  to indict  Hayes as  a habitual criminal.  Hayes
pleaded  not  guilty,  the  habitual  criminal  indictment  was  obtained,  and
Hayes was convicted.  He claimed that the prosecutor's behavior violated his
constitutional  rights.  The  Supreme  Court  rejected  Hayes'  claim,  over  four
dissents.  As will be shown in Part I,  it accepted  the argument that the prose-
cutor's behavior was  a constitutionally permissible  side effect of a  system in
which plea bargaining  played a large  role.  But Part I argues that no version
of legal  formalism  can  determine  a particular  result  in Bordenkircher. We
suggest  that it  is  plausible  from  our analysis  to  generalize  that the same  is
true  for other  cases,  as well  as for other versions  of formalism.
4.  434  U.S.  357 (1978).
5.  434  U.S.  at 358-59 & n.3.  The  statute  had  been  repealed  by  the time  the Court  de-
cided  the case.  Under the new statute the sexual  assault would  not have been the basis  for an
enhanced  sentence because Hayes committed  it  when he was  17.  Id.  at 359 n.2.  Justice  Pow-
ell,  in dissent, noted  that Hayes might be eligible  for parole after serving  15  years.  Id.  at 370
n. I (Powell,  J.,  dissenting).  Under the new statute, Hayes' enhanced sentence would have been
at  most  a  10-20  year indeterminate  term.  Id. at  359 n.2.
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In Part II we  discuss the descendant  of fact-skepticism.  Here, the critical
approach  is less well-developed;  our critical perspective  concentrates  on the
law-in-action  in  a broad  frame,  thereby  considering  factors  which are  not
usually taken into account  in discussions of criminal  procedure.6  We argue
that the wide scope of this perspective  is likely to lead to a more realistic and
thoughtful  response to the  problems  of law enforcement,  and to  useful  in-
sights into the operation  of law more generally.
I.  CRITIQUE  OF  LEGAL  FORMALISM  IN CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE
A.  Classical  Doctrinal Formalism
Hayes' claim had powerful  intuitive appeal.  He had a constitutional right
to insist on a trial, but as  a  result of his exercise  of that right, his sentence
escalated  from  five-years  to  life in  prison.  It  is not difficult  to  see  that the
penalty imposed derived  at least as much from  Hayes' insistence on his con-
stitutional rights as it did from his three prior felonies,  a fact that the prose-
cutor knew  when he offered the  five-year sentence.  Further, the Court  had
previously recognized that similar penalties were unconstitutional.  In North
Carolina  v. Pearce, 7  the Court held that on retrial following a successful ap-
peal, a  defendant's  sentence could  not constitutionally  be  increased  absent
new  evidence.8  Blackledge v. Perry 9  extended  this principle  to prohibit  a
prosecutor  from  reindicting  a  convicted  misdemeanant  on  a  felony  charge
after the defendant had invoked his or her statutory  right to a trial de novo.
In these  cases the Court argued that the constitutional  vice lay  in the possi-
bility that the sentencing judge or the prosecutor might vindictively enhance
the defendant's  risks in retaliation  for  invoking  the right to  appeal  or  to a
trial de novo.
Retaliation might be wrong for at least two reasons.  It might place a bur-
den on the defendant's choice to exercise  the statutory right to appeal.  Such
a judicial  burden  might  impermissibly  take away  with  one  hand  what the
legislature had offered with the other.  But the Court in Bordenkircher  relied
on earlier  cases showing  that the principle  was not one of nondeterrence.' °
Thus,  retaliation  must  be  wrong  for  some  other  reason.  Presumably,
although  the Court did not say so,  the fact that a vindictive judge or prose-
6.  But see Trubek,  Where the Action Is:  Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN.
L.  REV.  575  (1984).
7.  395 U.S.  711  (1969).
8.  On what  constitutes  new  evidence,  see  Wasman  v. United  States,  104  S. Ct.  3217
(1984).
9.  417  U.S. 21  (1974).
10.  434  U.S.  at  363  (citing  Colten  v.  Kentucky,  407  U.S.  104  (1972);  Chaffin  v.
Stynchcombe,  412  U.S.  17  (1973)).
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cutor simply has an unattractive  state of mind would be insufficient  to grant
relief unless that state of mind had some unattractive  consequences  as well.
The Court in Bordenkircher  used "punishment"  as a  synonym  for "retalia-
tion.""  Punishment has a deterrence dimension, but considering  that alone
would  reduce this rationale  to the one which the  Court rejected.  Thus, the
Court  appears  to  have meant  that  retaliating  for  the  exercise  of statutory
rights  is impermissible  because it serves  no appropriate  penological  goals.
With that established,  the Court turned to the problem in Bordenkircher.
The test it applied was whether  reindictment  in these circumstances  served
some appropriate  penological  goals.  Here  the Court was quite firm.  Hayes
was reindicted as a result of the choices he made in the course of the bilateral
"give-and-take"  of plea bargaining.  Prior cases had established  the constitu-
tionality  of plea  bargaining,  a  process  in  which  a  defendant  relinquishes  a
variety  of constitutional  rights  in  exchange  for  a  reduced  charge  or  sen-
tence. 2  But if plea bargaining  is to succeed, the prosecutor must have some
negotiating  room.  In Hayes'  case  the prosecutor's hand included  the habit-
ual  criminal  statute.  Hayes  could  have been  charged  initially  under  that
statute, with the prosecutor  offering  a reduction  in exchange.  The prosecu-
tor's actual methods  were functionally  indistinguishable. 1 3
What  might  a  critic  of doctrinal  formalism  say  about  Bordenkircher?
Plainly the goal is to establish that the available doctrines could be deployed
in favor of or against Hayes'  claim.  The easiest way to do that is to note that
the  doctrines  operate  on  two levels,  which  we  call  the  individual  and the
systemic levels.  On the individual level, one hears claims that the result in a
particular  case  is  appropriate  or  unfair;  on  the  systemic  level  one  hears
claims  that the  result  is  an  integral  part,  or  an  unnecessary  distortion,  of
some  larger scheme.  Doctrinal formalism fails both because it cannot tell us
when to operate  on which  level  and because,  on both levels,  either result is
fairly  defensible.
We begin  with the  individual  level,  where  Hayes'  claims  seem  most ap-
pealing.  His argument  is that the Constitution promises  him the  right  to a
trial,  and yet  when  he sought  to  make  good  on  that  promise  he ended  up
much  worse than he would  have,  had he understood  that the  promise  was
hollow.  Thus, his situation is just like that of the defendants  in Pearce and
Blackledge.  Yet the  Court could respond that  the prosecutor  did  no more
than  expose  Hayes  to a  liability  for  which  he  was  "properly  chargeable"' 4
and  for which  there was sufficient  evidence.  So long  as Hayes  knew  of the
11.  Id.
12.  See, e.g.,  Brady  v. United  States,  397  U.S.  742,  751-53  (1970).
13.  434  U.S. at  360-61.
14.  Id.  at  364.
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risks he ran 5  and was convicted  and  sentenced  "[w]ithin  the  limits set  by
the  legislature's  constitutionally  valid  definition  of  chargeable  offenses" 16
and sentences, 7  Hayes'  claim of unfairness  is unpersuasive.
In addition, Hayes'  complaint  is fundamentally  identical to a challenge to
all plea bargaining.  The only  difference  is  that  when a plea  bargain  is ac-
cepted  the defendant  simultaneously  relinquishes  his  or  her  constitutional
rights and gains a benefit, whereas  Hayes rejected the plea bargain offer and
thereafter suffered a burden.  If the former is acceptable, as the plea bargain-
ing cases hold, surely the latter, its mirror image, must be acceptable as well.
Although the  Court used language consistent with an individual level  re-
sponse to Hayes, most of its discussion operated on the systemic level.  Bar-
gaining  necessarily  involves  one  party  offering  something  attractive  to the
other, coupled  with  threats that if the  offers are  rejected,  the other party's
position will worsen.  If a system of bargaining  is to survive, the prosecutor
must  be  allowed  to carry  through  on  the threats  made  in  the  bargaining
process.1 8  According  to  the  Court,  this  is  precisely  what  distinguished
Bordenkircher from Pearce. The latter involved  "the  State's unilateral  im-
position of a penalty";' 9 the former involved the bilateral give-and-take  of a
bargaining system.  On this view,  the  result in Bordenkircher follows  from
the prior  approval  of plea bargaining.
Yet  Hayes  has  a number  of systemic-level  responses.  First, the  Court's
effort  to distinguish Pearce is unavailing  if we  take systemic concerns  seri-
ously.  The system  surely must  include the applicable  legal  rules.  But then
the state's  action in Pearce is no  longer unilateral in  any meaningful  sense:
the  defendant  chooses  to  appeal  knowing  that  if the  appeal  succeeds  and
there  is a  new conviction  after  retrial,  the sentence  may be  enhanced.  The
rule  of law  that  requires this communicates  the threat  to the defendant  no
15.  Id.  at 360.
16.  Id. at  364.
17.  Pizzi,  Prosecutorial Discretion,  Plea Bargaining  and the  Supreme  Court's  Opinion  in
Bordenkircher  v.  Hayes,  6  HASTINGS  CONST.  L.Q.  269,  293-96  (1978),  suggests  that  the
mandatory  life sentence  in  Bordenkircher should  have  played a  greater  role than  this  in  the
Court's analysis.  Yet if the sentence is not itself unconstitutional, compare  Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980),  with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983),  it is unclear  why it should affect
the analysis  of the  procedures  that  lead  up to  its  imposition.  Pizzi  properly  notes  that  the
sentencing scheme  in Bordenkircher gave the prosecutor no more control over disposition than
do other mandatory  or determinate  sentencing schemes.  See also Note, Criminal Law-Plea
Bargaining-Due  Process Not  Violated  when  Prosecutor  Carries  Out  Threat  To  Reindict Ac-
cused  on  More  Serious  Charges  After  Plea  Bargain  on  Original  Charge  Is  Refused,
Bordenkircher  v.  Hayes,  10 ST.  MARY'S  L.J.  329,  338  (1978).
18.  See Seidman,  Factual Guilt and the Burger Court:  An Examination  of  Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure,  80 COLUM.  L.  REV.  436,  479  (1980).
19.  Bordenkircher, 434  U.S.  at  362  (emphasis  added).
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less effectively  than the prosecutor in Bordenkircher  did when he communi-
cated  his threat.  That is,  the  existing rules of law,  not just the face-to-face
exchange, constitute  the state's  mode of bargaining  behavior.
Second,  one  can  characterize  the bargaining  system  as bilateral  only  by
adopting  what  from  Hayes'  point  of  view  is  an  arbitrary  time  frame.  In
labor-management  relations, a party who makes  a "take  it or leave  it"  offer
risks a strike or a lockout.  But the defendant who rejects such an offer from
a prosecutor  cannot  threaten  to  do  as  much  damage to  the  prosecutor  as
management  can  do  to  a  union.  The risk  the defendant  runs-an almost
certain  conviction-is much greater  than  the risk the  prosecutor runs-in-
creased  costs.  Thus,  at the moment the prosecutor  decides to  make a  final
offer,  the bilateral  exchange  becomes  unilateral:  the  defendant  can  do  al-
most nothing to change  the prosecutor's  position.2"
Third, the Court in Bordenkircher  believed that its result was necessary  to
make plea bargaining work.  That concern  is not obviously legitimate.  Had
Hayes  prevailed,  prosecutors  could have  preserved  plea  bargaining  by  ad-
justing  their  charging  practices.  For  example,  Hayes  could  have  been
charged  initially as a habitual criminal, and the charge could have been bar-
gained  down.  More  generally,  prosecutors  could  select  charges  that  they
believe to be penologically  appropriate,  then make an upward adjustment in
order  to  be  able  to  bargain.2'  "Overcharging"  in  this  manner  has  several
advantages.  It makes the prosecutor's charging practices  "visible  to the gen-
eral public" rather than concealing them in "unrecorded  verbal warnings, 22
and  it  lets  the  defendant  know  from  the outset,  rather  than at  some  later
point in the  bargaining, the  consequences of a bargaining breakdown.23
The result in Bordenkircher  is therefore  less consistent with the precedents
than  it might have first  appeared  to be.  But  it may  be somewhat  easier  to
20.  See Note, Prosecutorial  Vindictiveness and Plea Bargaining: What are the Limits?-
Bordenkircher  v.  Hayes,  27  DE  PAUL  L.  REV.  1241,  1254  (1978).  This  reflects  the  actual
power  positions of the parties.  Given the assumption that almost all defendants  are factually
guilty, the entire bargaining process exists at the prosecutor's discretion.  In a sense, then, plea
bargaining cannot  be  bilateral.
21.  Justice  Blackmun's dissent called  this  "cynical,"  Bordenkircher,  434  U.S.  at  368  n.2
(Blackmun, J.,  dissenting), but it is hard to see why it is anything other than a rational calcula-
tion  given a set of legal  rules.  Compare Note, supra note 20, at 1250  (initial charge  represents
judgment on  appropriate  penological  goals).
22.  Bordenkircher, 434  U.S.  at  369.
23.  Note, Due Process-Plea  Bargaining-A State Prosecutor  Does Not  Violate  the Due
Process Clause by Carrying  Out a Threat Made During Plea Negotiations To Have the Accused
Reindicted on  More Serious  Charges If  He  Does Not Plead Guilty to  the  Offense  Which  Was
Originally  Charged:  Bordenkircher  v.  Hayes,  6  AM.  J. CRIM.  L.  201,  209  (1978);  Note,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes:  Ignoring  ProsecutorialAbuses  in Plea Bargaining,  66 CALIF. L. REV.
875,  881  (1978).
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reconcile  with  the  plea  bargaining  cases  than  would  a  rule  that  induced
"overcharging."  The Court  in Bordenkircher thought that  the "overcharg-
ing"  alternative  might  "invite  unhealthy  subterfuge  that  would  drive  the
practice  of  plea  bargaining  back  into  the  shadows."24  Presumably  that
would  occur because  the "overcharging"  alternative  would skew  a prosecu-
tor's incentives.  In order to have something  to bargain with, while still pro-
moting public safety, the prosecutor must select an initial charge higher than
is  penologically  appropriate. 2 5  Accepting  a  plea  to  a  reduced  charge  then
exposes the prosecutor  to public  criticism.  The "overcharging"  alternative,
rather  than  making  plea  practices  visible,  actually  will  make  them  more
clandestine.26
There  are  equally  valid  doctrinal  arguments  on both the  individual  and
the systemic levels, though perhaps the Court has a slightly stronger position
on the  systemic  level  and  Hayes  the better  stance  on  the  individual  level.
Nothing  within  the  doctrinal  framework  tells  us  which  level  to  choose.
Thus,  resolving  Bordenkircher requires  looking  beyond  the  common  doc-
trine  articulated in prior  cases.
B.  Moral Philosophy
We  next  address  moral  philosophy  as  a  source  for  resolving  doctrinal
problems.  The  basic  idea  here  is that  the  analyst  chooses  some  brand  of
contemporary  moral  philosophy-for  example,  a  theory  of  free  will,  the
value of the  adversary  system,  retributivism-and  describes  how  the prob-
lem of Bordenkircher  should be  solved within that brand of philosophy.  By
selecting a version  of moral philosophy on which the analyst expects general
agreement, he or she hopes to develop  an analysis that provides  results that
must be  accepted,  despite their  apparently  controversial  nature.2 7  The  cri-
tique of this  version of formalism  shows that the purported  deduction  does
not really  work.  The same  set of moral principles  can lead  to  opposite  re-
sults in Bordenkircher.
24.  Bordenkircher, 434  U.S. at 364-65  & n.2.
25.  Prosecutors  might  still engage  in  "evidence"  bargaining;  that is,  they might  expose
their evidentiary  hands and  say,  "This  is what  we think  we  can get on  this evidence."  Later
stages  in  the  process  would  be  propelled  by  different  estimates  of the outcome  and  of the
prosecutor's honesty.  We doubt that this is what the Court had  in mind when it  defended the
process  of plea bargaining.
26.  In addition, a rule  that allowed prosecutors only to bargain  charges down might make
prosecutors too cautious in offering concessions,  out of concern  that a concession, once offered,
could  not be retracted  without  violating the prohibition  on bargaining  upward.
27.  Cf J.  FEINBERG,  DOING &  DESERVING:  ESSAYS  IN  THE  THEORY  OF  RESPONSIBIL-
ITY  (1970)  (discussing  various rationales  for punishment).
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1.  Voluntariness and Theories of Free Will
At the center  of the majority's decision  in Bordenkircher is the  assertion
that plea bargaining is constitutional  "so long as the accused is free to accept
or  reject the prosecution's  offer.",2 8  The prosecution  is entitled to structure
the defendant's  choices, so long as  the defendant  is left  with some choice.29
In its abstract form, a theory of free will that centers on  the existence of a
choice would find many adherents.3 °  Hayes was fully informed of the conse-
quences  of his choice;  he was "free"  to choose another alternative.  As nu-
merous commentators have demonstrated, however, this kind of free-will-in-
the-abstract is far from the freedom the defendant actually  feels  when faced
with  a  plea  bargaining  decision.3  Studies  confirm  that  "[tihe  undeniable
fact  is  that  defendants  convicted  after trial  receive  longer  sentences  than
those  who  plead  guilty."32  Other  forms of  plea  bargains,  such  as  charge
reduction  or dismissal, only serve  to strengthen  the institutional bias toward
plea  bargaining.3  That is,  the choice  occurs  within a structure that makes
the  decision  to plead guilty  more attractive  than the merits of the trade-off
between  risk  of conviction  and  length  of sentence  actually warrants.  De-
fendants,  especially recidivists  like Hayes,  as well as experienced  defense at-
torneys,  know  this.  Thus,  the prosecutor  may  offer the  defendant a  choice
that appears to be real when presented without regard to its social surround-
ings,  while in practice the defendant knows that his choice is limited by the
systemic bias towards inducing  guilty  pleas.34
In a system that allows the prosecutor  to limit the defendant's  choices  in
these ways-a system in which the prosecutor  can engage in Bordenkircher-
type  bargaining-the  defendant's  choice  is  considered  free.  This  is  so  be-
cause of the institutional  norm against which one's freedom of choice is eval-
uated.  However,  if the institutional  norm were  different,  if the system  did
not allow  the prosecutor  to threaten  prosecution under  a habitual  criminal
28.  434  U.S.  at 363.
29.  Id. at  364.
30.  The  Bordenkircher Court  rather explicitly accepts  this theory  when it  states that the
prosecutor  in  this case  "no  more  than  openly  presented  the  defendant  with  the  unpleasant
alternatives"  available  to him.  Id.  at  365.  For  a popular  version of free  will based  on choice,
see  Stace,  The Problem of Free Will,  REASON AND  RESPONSIBILITY  347-51  (J.  Feinberg, ed.
1981)  ("Acts  freely  done are  those  whose  immediate  causes  are  psychological  states  in  the
agent.  Acts not freely done  are those whose immediate  causes are states  of affairs  external to
the agents,"  id. at 350).
31.  See, e.g.,  M.  HEUMANN,  PLEA BARGAINING:  THE  EXPERIENCES  OF  PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES,  AND  DEFENSE  ATTORNEYS  156-57  (1978).
32.  J. BOND,  PLEA  BARGAINING  AND  GUILTY  PLEAS  2-19  (1982).
33.  Id.  at  1-16.
34.  See  A.  ROSETr  &  D.  CRESSEY,  JUSTICE  BY  CONSENT:  PLEA  BARGAINS  IN THE
AMERICAN  COURTHOUSE  29  (1976).
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statute as a means of inducing a guilty plea, a defendant's  choice could  also
be considered  free when so limited.  Prosecutors  could adjust their practices
so  that  the  range  of resolutions  available  to defendants  would  not be  less
attractive  than  the  range  available  under  alternative  institutional  norms.
What is operative, then,  is a theory of criminal procedure, of what the insti-
tutional  norm ought to be, and  not a theory of free  will.
2.  Voluntariness and the Adversary System
Professor Alschuler has  persuasively argued  that the Court  did not have
free will  in  mind  at  all  when talking  about  voluntariness."  Instead,  "the
critical  issue  in  each  case  was  the  effectiveness  of the  legal  representation
that the defendant had received.",36  So long as the defendant had been repre-
sented by competent counsel throughout the proceedings against him or her,
the  plea would be treated as "voluntary."37
According  to this view,  the version of moral philosophy  that determines
the  result  in a particular  case  is  not a theory  of free  will,  but is  instead  a
theory about the effectiveness of an adversary system in securing rights.  The
moral judgment being made is that so long as the adversary system operates
effectively, decisions made within that system are acceptable and can be said,
somewhat  misleadingly, to be voluntary.3"
Again, though, the operative  notions  are really those relating to criminal
procedure, and not those relating to the adversary ideal.  The issue for crimi-
nal  procedure in  this context  is  whether plea  bargaining occurs  within  the
adversary  system at all, or whether it represents a departure  from that sys-
tem.  If the norm is an adversary  system with all of the vigor one associates
with  a  trial-type  disposition,  one  will  find  that  most  plea  bargaining  falls
short  of that norm.39  On the other hand,  if the norm  is  one  that  accepts
relaxation  of the adversary  nature  of relations  between prosecutor  and de-
fense  counsel for the purpose of arriving  at a bargain, plea bargaining  will
fall  within the  ambit of this norm.  Thus, one's conception  of the  degree of
adversariness  that is appropriate  in the context  of plea bargaining-a judg-
ment made  in  the context  of discussions  of criminal  procedure,  not  of the
adversary  ideal-is what matters.
35.  Alschuler,  The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and  the Guilty Plea,  47 U. COLO.
L.  REV.  1 (1975).
36.  Id. at  1.
37.  Id. at  26.  The reasoning  here  demonstrates  the  tendency  of courts  to collapse  the
standard  of intelligence into the standard  of voluntariness.  J.  BOND, supra note  32,  at  3-7.
38.  This was  made explicit  in  Tollett  v.  Henderson,  411  U.S.  258,  267 (1973).
39.  Sarat, Understanding Trial Courts: A  Critique  of Social Science Approaches, 61  JUDI-
CATURE  318,  321  (1978);  P. UTZ,  SETTING  THE FACTS:  DISCRETION  AND  NEGOTIATION  IN
CRIMINAL  COURT  131  (1978).
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3.  Retributivism
A third version of moral philosophy which  is popular  today is retributiv-
ism.  In its strong form,  retributivism  holds that "all  wrongdoers  [must] be
made  to  suffer  some  penalty  . . . as  a  requital  for  their  wrongdoing."'
Here,  Bordenkircher presents  a  particular  version  of the  general  problem
posed  by  all  recidivist  statutes.  Imprisoning  someone  for  a  minor offense
after he or she has committed and has been punished for a number of crimes
in the past fails  to ration punishment  according to the  offense at issue.  In-
deed, the offender is being punished again, and excessively,  given that appro-
priate retributivist  punishment  has  already  been  imposed.  In these  terms,
according to  a retributivist  theory,  all  recidivist  statutes should  be  prohib-
ited.  Further, a retributivist ought to be troubled by a system that trades the
costs of assessing  punishment for a  reduction  in an otherwise appropriately
retributivist  sanction.
Again,  however,  one's judgments  about the criminal justice  system come
into play,  for  one  might  note  the  imperfection  of the  system  of imposing
punishment.4"  The prosecutor  in Bordenkircher cannot  be  sure that appro-
priate retributivist punishment has been imposed in the past.42  Therefore,  in
an imperfect world,  it makes sense to give the prosecutor  discretion  to seek
enhanced  punishment  when  appropriate.  This  is  a  second-best  solution.
The retributivist  would  prefer that all  punishments  provide for  appropriate
retribution,  but  he or  she  knows  they  will  not.  In  light  of this imperfec-
tion-this judgment about the criminal justice system and not about the val-
ues of retributivism-Bordenkircher  makes  sense.
C.  Law and Economics
The law and  economics approach  is probably the dominant innovation in
formalism  in recent  years.  Richard  Posner has  noted that  "there  has been
very little  economic  analysis of criminal  procedure,"  but adds that a  recent
article by Frank Easterbrook "suggests  that there are many promising appli-
cations of economics  to criminal procedure."43  Easterbrook treats  plea bar-
gaining  as  a  market  system  in  which  self-interested  defendants  and
40.  J. FEINBERG,  supra note 27,  at  217.
41.  Indeed,  plea bargaining, since it reaches results in which the defendant is charged  with
and punished for some crime less onerous than the state believes  he or she actually committed,
contributes to this imperfection.
42.  Hayes had served  five years  in a reformatory  for sexual assault and  received a sentence
of five years'  probation  for  robbery.  434  U.S.  at 359 n.3.
43.  Posner,  Comment on  "On  the Economic  Theory of Crime,"  NoMos  XXVII:  CRIMI-
NAL  JUSTICE  310,  312 (J.  Pennock & J. Chapman  eds.  1985).
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prosecutors  reach  agreements."  If plea  bargaining  is  a  well-functioning
market, it reaches  socially optimal results by the mechanism  of self-interest;
external  regulations  such  as a prohibition  on  certain negotiating  tactics are
undesirable because  they impair the functioning of the market.
Easterbrook's central  argument about plea bargaining is that it consists of
bargains entered  into after negotiation between the parties.  Each has a set of
preferences.  For example, the defendant is likely to prefer a shorter sentence
to  a longer  one;  the prosecutor  would  like some  information  regarding the
crime,  and  the  like.  Bargaining  results in  a  deal, with  the  sentence as  the
price  the  defendant  is  willing  to  pay.  Easterbrook  shows  that  defendants
who place a higher value on the next few years than they do on years further
in the future will readily negotiate for and accept shorter sentences than they
would receive  after trial.45
Easterbrook  understands  that  markets  can  be  flawed,  and  discusses  a
number of possible  failures  in  the  plea market,  dismissing  them  as  unsub-
stantiated.  Yet he does not address two central problems with the plea mar-
ket, both of which make plausible the idea that  a regulatory prohibition  on
certain  negotiating tactics will improve the functioning  of the market.
The first problem is that the plea market has the characteristics of a classic
"market  for  lemons.",46  In  such  a market,  low  quality  goods  are  sold  at
prices  that  only  high  quality  merchandise  should  command.  Markets  for
lemons  arise when goods vary  in  quality,  when  buyers are uncertain  about
the quality of a particular item they are about to purchase, and when  sellers
know  more  than  buyers  do  about  the  quality  of particular  items.  In  the
market  for pleas, defendants and prosecutors have asymmetrical knowledge.
We  assume that  most defendants  in fact committed  the crimes  with which
they are charged. 47  We also assume, though more questionably, that defend-
ants tell their attorneys everything they know.4"  Thus, defendants know the
44.  Easterbrook, Criminal  Procedure  as a Market System,  12 J. LEGAL  STUD.  289 (1983).
45.  Id. at 312-13.
46.  See G.  AKERLOF,  AN  ECONOMIC  THEORIST'S  BOOK  OF  TALES  7-22  (1984).
47.  We  note that the existence of some innocent  defendants  is likely  to skew  the analysis
further against  Easterbrook,  by creating  a population  as to which the asymmetries  in  knowl-
edge are  even more severe.  In addition, innocent defendants are more likely to go to trial, and
those  who  are  convicted  will  receive  longer  sentences  than  innocent  defendants  who plead
guilty  and  (perhaps)  than guilty  defendants who plead  guilty.  We  take  it  to be obvious that
this is  troubling regardless  of the view  of plea bargaining.
48.  Easterbrook treats this assumption under the heading of "agency  costs,"  Easterbrook,
supra note 44,  at  309, and calls  the problems of agency  costs "trivial."  Id.  Again, he fails to
identify  the  interesting  problems, such  as a regime  of ethical rules  and  a  set  of psychological
dispositions  that give defendants incentives to withhold information  from  their attorneys.  For
a discussion,  see K.  MANN,  DEFENDING  WHITE COLLAR  CRIME 40-51,  243-49  (1985).
Our concern here is that the actors on both  sides of the bargain  may not be equally rational.
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facts about the crime.  But they do not know what knowledge the prosecutor
possesses,  such  as  the  number  of eyewitnesses  the prosecutor  actually  has
and  the  strength  of their  identifications.  Prosecutors  who  claim  to  have
three eyewitnesses,  all of whom have made firm identifications,  may be seen
by defendants  as used-car  salespeople  describing the former owner's perfect
record  with  the car now  being sold.  The result is that pleas  are deals, but
suboptimal  ones.49
Easterbrook outlines  one possible  response:  if the goods are offered  by a
number of sellers,  buyers will  shop to find  a seller who fully  discloses what
he or  she knows  about the  goods.  Similarly,  then,  one  could argue  that  if
prosecutors  have, and advertise,  an "open  files"  policy,  potential defendants
will  commit their crimes in that jurisdiction.5°  But this ignores the dynam-
ics of a market  for lemons.  First, defendants simply  cannot  know  whether
the prosecutor's  open  files  are the  only  files.51  They will  therefore  treat  a
high-quality  product  as if it were low quality,  and  fail  to accept offers  that
would yield optimal outcomes.  Second, the "open  files"  prosecutor  will no-
tice  an  influx  of criminals  from  other jurisdictions  and  will  rationally  re-
spond by altering the policy.  There will be a typical "race  to the bottom" as
prosecutors try to enhance the asymmetry in knowledge  by concealing more
information  than  do  prosecutors  elsewhere.  The  result  once  again  is  a
suboptimal  system.52
The permanent bureaucracy  of the prosecutor's  office  seems to us more likely to be concerned
with long-term rationality  than are defendants, even  defendants who are repeat  offenders rep-
resented  by  lawyers  from  the  public  defender  bureaucracy.  We  suppose  that  this  concern
would be diminished  in cases  involving  organized crime and  high-level corporate  crime.  But
we confine  our concern  to  this note in  order  to deal  with  Easterbrook's  analysis on  its own
terms.
49.  Our unsystematic intuition  is that the suboptimality lies  in defendants'  overestimates
of the quality of the prosecutor's evidence,  leading to the defendants'  willingness to pay higher
prices-accept  higher sentences-than  they would in  a well-functioning  market.  But nothing
turns on  this intuition;  suboptimally low  sentences  are just  as objectionable.
50.  Easterbrook, supra note 44,  at 291.
51.  In  Palmer  v. City  of Chicago,  755  F.2d  560  (7th  Cir.  1985),  the court  discussed  a
practice in  which  the Chicago  police maintained  "street  files"  that were  not  disclosed  to de-
fendants'  attorneys  who requested  material pursuant  to  the rule  of Brady  v.  Maryland,  373
U.S.  83  (1963).
52.  The  usual  law  and  economics  response  to  "race  to  the bottom"  arguments  is  that
buyers will switch from  one good to an equally acceptable substitute if all sellers offer goods of
unacceptable  quality.  We are inclined to think that this response  is unavailable  in  the present
context.  Buyers---criminals-who  have chosen unlawful  activity  are unlikely  to have equally
acceptable  alternatives  available  to them, given  their  preferences.  If their  preferences  count,
the outcome  is suboptimal.  If they do not count, because they are unlawful,  the market  analy-
sis collapses entirely.  Additionally, if their preferences change as a result of changes  in prose-
cutors'  policies,  preferences  become  endogenous  variables,  functions of, among other things,
the legal  rules of the system.  Once that happens,  it is senseless to defend any particular regime
of legal  rules  as socially optimal.  Each  regime maximizes  the achievement  of the values  held
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The second  general  problem  with the  plea market  arises  on the prosecu-
tor's  side.  Easterbrook's  analysis  assumes that  the  prosecutor  is  a  perfect
agent for the preferences of society's law-abiding  citizens.  But in a different
part  of his  article, he recognizes  the  problem  of agency  costs, that  is,  costs
that  arise  because  the  prosecutor's  incentives  are  not  identical  to  those  of
society  as  a whole.  Unfortunately, he discusses  only  half the  problem, and
ignores the half relevant to the plea market.  Easterbrook  argues that prose-
cutors  may  not  "seek  to  maximize  the  deterrence  available  from  [their]
budget[s]." 53  They may prosecute  weak cases against "politically unpopular
figures (Communists, presidents of large corporations,  Reverend  Moon)." 54
We  defer  for  a  moment  our  discussion of Easterbrook's  analysis  of this
point.  Our present  objective  is  to note that Easterbrook  does  not consider
whether prosecutors may seek to achieve  an undesirably  high level of deter-
rence  by  demanding  pleas  at  high  sentences  and  then  holding  firm.  Few
prosecutors or judges lose their jobs because they are too severe in their plea
and sentencing practices.  Yet high sentences  have  effects elsewhere  in the
criminal justice  system,  especially  in the  prisons  where  they  contribute  to
overcrowding.  Because prosecutors do not bear the costs of those down-the-
line effects,  they may  demand and  accept suboptimal  pleas."
Easterbrook  responds  to market  failure  objections  like  these  by  arguing
that there is no reason  to think that a regulatory alternative  is better.56  But
the  only  regulatory  alternative  he  considers  is  a  case-by-case  review  of a
prosecutor's decision by "some other public official,"  an official who, Easter-
brook properly observes,  is unlikely to have "better" incentives.  Even if the
reviewing official did have stronger incentives,  he or she could simplify mat-
ters  by  restructuring  the prosecutor's  office to incorporate  those  incentives
rather than  creating a  new office.
57  Easterbrook  mentions the possibility  of
regulation by a "set of internal controls,"5 '  but he does not analyze the point
independently,  nor does he analyze the  possibility  of external  control.  Yet
by  those  whose values  are created  by that  regime.  This is  hardly  a ground upon  which  one
could  rest  an evaluation  of alternative sets of legal  rules.
53.  Easterbrook, supra note 44,  at  300.
54.  Id.
55.  The  late  John  Manson,  Corrections  Commissioner  of Connecticut,  suggested  that
prosecutors could be forced to internalize these  costs by a system that allocated prison  cells to
prosecutors,  so  that a  prosecutor  would have to  worry  about  using up  his or her  quota too
early  in  the year.  See  Blumstein,  Comment,  12  N.Y.U.  REV.  L. &  SOC.  CHANGE  115,  119
(1983-84).  Cf  Knapp,  Comment,  12  N.Y.U.  REV.  L.  &  Soc.  CHANGE  121  (1983-84)
(describing  Minnesota's  Sentencing Guidelines  Commission, which  is required  to take prison
capacity into account  in  formulating sentencing guidelines).
56.  Easterbrook, supra note 44, at  301,  310.
57.  Id.  at 301.
58.  Id. at  300.
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regulation  clearly can  reduce the "lemons"  problem and  the problem  of ex-
cessive  deterrence.  For example,  one regulation that could  be added,  along
with changes such as liberal discovery rules in criminal cases, might be a rule
prohibiting the  negotiating  tactic of upping the  ante.
Economic analysis therefore does not unequivocally  show that the Court's
decision  in Bordenkircher  to leave the prosecutor unregulated is socially op-
timal.  Yet the problems of information  and agency costs that we have iden-
tified  are so  complex  that  we are convinced,  even without  having done the
formal  modeling,  that alternative  sets of plausible  assumptions  about those
costs,  assumptions  that  are  unverifiable  by  empirical  investigation,  would
produce  conclusions  supporting both  sides of the issue  in Bordenkircher. 59
D.  Sociology of Professions
The last version of legal formalism that we address  is the contention that
the system of rules of criminal procedure is designed  to meet the concerns  of
the participants  in a system that the participants conceive  of as a  system of
jobs.  The idea is that we can look at the system to discover what rules would
make life  easiest  for the  repeat  players  in the  system  and  then  explain  the
actual rules as consistent  with what we  would expect.6°  "Organization the-
ory"  tells  us that  the participants  in the  criminal justice  system-prosecu-
tors,  defense  attorneys,  judges,  and  other  courtroom  personnel-form  an
"organized  network  of relationships.",61  "[I]nteractions  among  these court-
room members"  produce  the outcomes  of the criminal justice system.62  At-
tendance  at  plea  bargaining  sessions  is  restricted  to the  players  who  have
learned to work together.  Both the defendant and the victim are excluded,63
thereby making the jobs of the participants  easier.  The ultimate disposition
of a particular  case  reflects  "patterns  of cooperation  and  conflict  between
different organizations." 6 4  The interests of the participants in the system are
the dominant  forces in structuring  that system.
Viewed in this context, plea bargaining can be explained  as a collaboration
between prosecutors  and  defense attorneys to process  with some facility  the
masses of cases that other participants in the system of criminal justice hand
over  to them.65  Plea  bargaining  offers  more  flexibility  to the  participants
59.  See  Peller, Book  Review,  98  HARV.  L. REV.  863,  871-72  (1985).
60.  Cf  P. UTZ, supra note 39,  at  18,  28.
61.  J.  EISENSTEIN  &  H. JACOB,  FELONY  JUSTICE:  AN  ORGANIZATIONAL  ANALYSIS  OF
CRIMINAL  COURTS  10  (1977).
62.  Id. at  294.
63.  Yngvesson & Mather, Courts, Moots, and the Disputing  Process, in  EMPIRICAL  THEO-
RIES  ABOUT  COURTS  79 (K.  Boyum  &  L.  Mather  eds.  1983).
64.  Id.
65.  M.  HEUMANN,  supra note 31,  at  156;  S.  BUCKLE  &  L. BUCKLE,  BARGAINING  FOR
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because it allows them to "structure  [their] time, allocate the resources avail-
able, and evaluate professional performance.",66  Bordenkircher  facilitates the
goals of the participants in the system by inducing more pleas.  It is a result
that we  might expect  this system  to produce.
Yet much of the power of this analysis  comes from  restrictions placed  on
its scope.  If we  treat the "work  group"  as extending  beyond the bounds of
the  courtroom  to  include  what  this  analysis  calls  external  actors,  different
results might be expected.  Similarly, if we  reduce the  relative weight of the
desire  to minimize uncertainty  and increase  the relative weight  of desires  to
reach particular substantive outcomes,  we might find that it would maximize
a  work group's values to  discourage the Bordenkircher  negotiating tactic.67
For example,  if one began  with  the  notion  that  participants  in the  sys-
tem-prosecutors,  defense  attorneys,  judges,  prison  officials-desired  that
defendants leave  the system no more dissatisfied  with the outcome than ab-
solutely necessary, Bordenkircher  might be seen as wrongly decided.  Indeed,
these participants  might think that their jobs  would be  easier if defendants
left  the system with the sense that they had been treated fairly.  This notion
is  especially true  if we define  the  "work  group"  to include  corrections  offi-
cials  who must  deal  with  defendants  once  they  reach  the prisons,  jails,  or
probation offices.  Thus, the competing interests of participants in the system
could lead to  different  and conflicting results  in Bordenkircher.
In addition,  organizational  theory  fails  to  take into  account  the broader
social factors which are at play.68  For example, a district attorney or judge
who is  elected  by the public,  or even appointed  by an  elected official,  must
take  more  into  account  than  the internal  pressures  to  cooperate  with  the
other members of the court group.  He or she must also consider the adverse
public  sentiment  regarding reduced  and dismissed  charges,  as well  as other
forms  of plea bargaining.  In this  context, Bordenkircher can  be  seen as  a
way  of showing  the public  that  prosecutors  can  be  tough with defendants,
even in the context of plea bargaining.  If such a decision helps the prosecu-
tor  to  do his  or  her political job  better,  Bordenkircher can  be  seen  as  an
expected  result.
However, the political arena includes many devout opponents of plea bar-
gaining, not because they believe that it is not tough enough on defendants,
JUSTICE:  CASE  DISPOSITION  AND  REFORM  IN  THE  CRIMINAL  COURTS  144  (1977);  Yngves-
son & Mather, supra note  63, at 79.
66.  S. BUCKLE  & L. BUCKLE,  supra note 65,  at  144.
67.  See  Schulhofer,  Is Plea Bargaining  Inevitable?, 97  HARv.  L.  REV.  1037,  1041-44
(1984).
68.  Jacob, Courts as Organizations,  in EMPIRICAL  THEORIES  ABOUT  COURTS,  supra note
63,  at  215;  Schulhofer, supra note  67,  at  1096-1100.
1986]Catholic University Law Review
but  because  they  believe  that  it increases  the  likelihood  of convicting  the
legally  innocent 69  and  that  it  produces  psychological  coercion"  aimed  at
encouraging  defendants  to  trade  away  their  constitutional  rights.7  On
grounds like these, Bordenkircher  is clearly wrong in giving prosecutors ad-
ditional  leverage  to  secure  guilty  pleas.  As such,  it adds  fuel  to  the  oppo-
nents'  fire, thereby making the political jobs of prosecutors  and judges more
difficult.
E.  Conclusion
Before turning to the second branch of legal realism's critical  heritage, we
wish to emphasize  two points.  First, some  versions  of legal formalism, par-
ticularly  the  more  empirically  based,  have  contributed  important  insights
toward  our understanding  of how the  criminal justice  system  works.  The
reason  for the critique  is that too frequently  those insights are presented  to
demonstrate that the rules of criminal procedure are understandable  and  in
some nontrivial  sense determined by a generalized value or system of values.
The aim of the critique is to show that, even when we take those values to be
important, the results that the formalists offer as in some sense already deter-
mined are, in fact, not determined at all.  Second, the formalisms' difficulties
have a  common  structure.  They produce  their results by  insisting that we
concentrate on the framework they present.  If we shift the frame-from the
individual to the systemic  level, from  abstract  moral philosophy  to specific
institutions, and so on-we can produce  alternative results.  Yet neither the
formalisms nor any  metatheory  specifies  what frame  we should  use.
Thus, on any set of formalist premises-four have been  examined, but the
critique claims  that if someone  came  up with another  one,  the proposition
would  follow  as well-Bordenkircher was  decided  rightly,  but  it  was  also
decided  wrongly.
II.  CRITIQUE  OF  LAW-IN-ACTION  THEORIES
The  second  branch  of  legal  realism  is  usually  called  fact-skepticism,
which,  in its initial formulations, was concerned  with the difference between
the  way  things  looked  to  a court  and  the  way  things  really were.72  More
generally, fact-skepticism directs our attention to what can be called the law-
69.  Rhodes, Plea-Bargaining, Crime Control, and Due Process:  A Quantitative Analysis, in
PLEA-BARGAINING  133 (W.  McDonald  & J. Cramer  eds.  1980).
70.  A.  RoSETT  & D.  CRESSEY,  supra note  34, at  29.
71.  Alschuler,  supra note  35,  at  58-65.
72.  See, e.g.,  J. FRANK,  COURTS  ON TRIAL,  MYTH AND REALITY  IN AMERICAN  JUSTICE
(1949).
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in-action.73  The second part of this article will present one version of what a
critical legal  studies  descendant  of fact-skepticism  might do  in the  area  of
criminal  procedure.74
A.  Controlling Discretion
Scholars of criminal procedure commonly  say that the general problem  of
criminal  procedure  is controlling  the discretion of what might be called the
line  officers,  the  people  at the bottom of the  official  hierarchy  of jobs  that
constitutes  the criminal justice  system."  The standard  view  holds  that we
have rules  about searches  to  ensure that the discretion  lodged in  police of-
ficers  will not be abused, rules about the provision of counsel to ensure that
the discretion lodged in low-level judges will not be abused,  and so on.76  In
this  standard  view,  the  reason  for  rules  is  to  protect  the  citizenry  from
abuses  of discretion.77  The difficulty  with this approach is that discretion is
both inevitable  and  often a  good thing.78  Because the  world is so complex,
no set of rules can tell prosecutors what the appropriate  plea arrangement  in
every drug related case should be.  When district attorneys try to control  the
discretion  of assistant prosecutors,  they  often  produce  rigidities  that  only
serve  to change the nature of plea bargaining from an explicit practice to an
implicit one.79  Responding to community pressures, some prosecutors have
73.  Indeed, a perspective which focuses  on process and  relations may  be the alternative  to
all  versions of formalism that will  alone  escape the critique of formalism.  Note, Radical Plu-
ralism: A  Proposed Theoretical Framework  for the Conference on  Critical  Legal Studies, 72
GEO.  L.J.  1143  (1984).
74.  We  reiterate  that the  critical  approach  here  is  less well-developed  than  the  critical
approach  to formalism.  This critical  perspective is offered  as one possible approach,  but is not
meant  to represent the approach  of critical  legal studies.
75.  Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and  Prosecutorial  Power: A Critique  of Recent Proposals
for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  550,  550  (1978).
76.  There  are  many examples of such  rules,  some statutory,  some developed  in case  law,
and  some  which  are  internal  regulations  promulgated  by  police  and  judicial  organizations
themselves.  For statutory examples of rules limiting police discretion in  searches, see FED. R.
CRIM.  P.  41  (procedures  for  issuance,  execution,  and  return  of search  warrants);  18  U.S.C.
§ 3109 (1982)  (limitations on  when  forcible entry  to execute search  warrant  permitted).  For
one of many cases  outlining the duty of the trial  court to appoint counsel for indigent defend-
ants, see United  States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir.  1982)  (duty of court
to determine whether defendant is indigent and, if so, to appoint counsel).  See generally Thir-
teenth Annual Review of Criminal  Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Ap-
peals 1982-1983, 72  GEO. L.J.  249,  272-78,  525-29 (1983).
77.  A.  BENT  &  R.  RossuM,  POLICE,  CRIMINAL  JUSTICE  AND  THE  COMMUNITY  72
(1976)  (police discretion  must "preserve a delicate balance between community protection and
individual  rights").
78.  M.  LIPSKY,  STREET-LEVEL  BUREAUCRACY:  DILEMMAS  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL  IN
PUBLIC  SERVICES  15  (1980).
79.  M.  HEUMANN,  supra note 31,  at  157-58.
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adopted  a  policy  of refusing  any  charge  reduction  in drug-related  cases.80
This policy limits the discretion of the prosecutor's assistants to further goals
frequently  thought  to  be  desirable.  Yet  now  we  face  a  new problem:  the
institutional  pressures to plea bargain  still exist.  Should the assistant prose-
cutor allow charges to be dismissed instead of reduced?  Should he or she go
to  trial  knowing  that  the judge  will  dismiss  charges  or  impose  a  sentence
with the prosecutor's new policy in mind?  The general point here is that by
controlling  discretion  we  simultaneously  accomplish  some  goals  that  may
protect the citizenry  from abuse,  but we  also foreclose  the accomplishment
of others, such  as  the  efficient  handling  of cases,  flexibility  and individual
case disposition,  which would  protect citizens from  abuse as  well.
B.  Reconceptualizing the Problem of Controlling  Discretion
The problem of controlling discretion can be reconceptualized  in a critical
way-critical  because  we  can  rethink the  nature of the system  of criminal
procedure  as  a  whole.8  Instead  of seeing  efforts  to control  discretion  as
efforts  to protect the  citizenry  from  abuse,  we  can  view  them  as  efforts  by
bureaucratic superiors, such as police chiefs,  head prosecutors, and appellate
judges,  to  assert  control  over  the  activities  of their  subordinates. 8 2  Some-
times  this  control  will  have  the  incidental  effect  of protecting the  citizenry
from abuse, but that is not the primary  purpose of the effort.  Viewed in this
manner, criminal  procedure is an exercise  in the assertion of power-not the
power  of enforcing  officials  against  the citizenry,  but the  power  of bureau-
cratic superiors against  their subordinates.
There are a number of advantages  to this perspective.  First, it brings into
view many activities  of enforcement officials that we usually  do not consider
part of criminal  procedure." s  On the most elementary  level,  it allows  us to
talk about different modes of asserting control  over subordinates.  Rules de-
veloped  by appellate  courts are not the only way to assert control, and  may
80.  Church, Plea Bargains,  Concessions and the Courts.- Analysis of a Quasi-Experiment,
10  LAW &  Soc. REV.  377,  378  (1976).
81.  S.  SCHEINGOLD,  THE POLITICS  OF  LAW  AND  ORDER:  STREET CRIME  AND  PUBLIC
POLICY  (1984),  is  written  from  a perspective similar to that urged  here, and provides  a  com-
prehensive  review of the relevant  law-in-action  research.  Scheingold also  concludes  by advo-
cating a returrt to neighborhood methods  of law enforcement,  but  his comments  are primarily
concerned  with  the development  of neighborhood  institutions to replace  criminal  courts, and
in  general  he accepts  the necessity  of centralized  and relatively  bureaucratized  police  forces.
See generally id. at  203-20.
82.  Cf  M.  CROZIER  &  E.  FRIEDBERG,  ACTORS  AND  SYSTEMS:  THE  POLITICS OF  COL-
LECTIVE ACTION  32 (1977)  (the "winner"  is the one who makes  the other's  action completely
predictable).
83.  Jacob, Courts as Organizations,  in EMPIRICAL  THEORIES  ABOUT  COURTS, supra note
63,  at  192.
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not be the best way.  Thus, we can talk about the development of rules by the
enforcement agencies themselves, such as police guidelines on the conduct of
line-ups or head prosecutors'  guidelines  on charging decisions.  These inter-
nal rules are certain to be more detailed  than the essentially nonexistent con-
straints that the courts will enforce.84
Another  example  may  be  worth  mentioning.  Appellate  law  has  almost
nothing to  say  about  the unique  position of public  defenders in  relation  to
plea  negotiation, even though  a  large percentage of criminal  cases are han-
dled by public  defenders."5  One would  not be surprised  to find  that public
defenders have internal office policies on the conduct of plea negotiations, or
norms communicated  through formal  training  or informal  conversations.86
These policies  belie the theme of the superior trying to guard against adverse
public  reaction  to the  plea  process  in  general.  Once  these aspects  of the
activities of the plea process are brought into view, appellate law can be seen
as a similar effort to control the behavior of subordinates.  Cases that may be
an example  are those in which effective assistance of counsel is the operative
standard  for evaluation  of voluntariness.87
Another part of enforcement activity that this perspective brings into view
is the presence and influence of unions, and of the organized bar.  One of the
constraints that superiors face is the organized political power of their subor-
dinates. 88  Typically, the subordinates think of themselves  as the best judges
84.  See Madison Wisconsin Police Department, Manual of Policy, Regulations and Proce-
dures §§  4-605-605.8, in  INTRODUCTION  TO  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  2-212-13  (W. Dickey, F.
Remington,  &  E. Cappella  eds.  1980)  (available  in  University  of Wisconsin  Law  School  Li-
brary) (police  guidelines for conducting line-ups);  United States Department of Justice Princi-
ples  of Federal Prosecution, 27  CRIM.  L.  RPTR.  3277  (1980)  (prosecutorial  guidelines  on
charging).
85.  L. MATHER,  PLEA  BARGAINING  OR TRIAL?  THE PROCESS  OF  CRIMINAL  CASE DIS-
POSITION  21 (1979).  We have in mind norms of the sort, "Don't plead until the office's investi-
gator  has tried at least  twice to find favorable  witnesses, but it's all right to plead  after that."
Rigid  policies applicable office-wide violate some ethical norms, but we doubt that such guide-
lines or rules  of thumb would.
86.  Though  we  have  been  unable  to locate  any  formal  (written)  public  defender  office
policies,  there  is  reason  to think  that informal  policies  do indeed exist.  For  example, some
public  defender  attorneys  negotiate  "package  deals"  relating  to  the  caseload  of the  entire
agency.  D.  JONES,  CRIME  WITHOUT  PUNISHMENT  121  (1979).  They  also  may  practice
"court  busting"  techniques,  where "a  coalition  of lawyers  ...  threaten  to bring their  entire
aggregate  caseloads  to trial  by jury unless their  demands are  met."  Id. at  122.  This  kind of
office-wide  activity indicates the existence of at least informal policies dealing with the conduct
of plea negotiations.
87.  See Alschuler, supra note 35  (reviewing  cases in  which voluntariness  is equated with
effective  assistance  of counsel).
88.  P.  WESTON,  SUPERVISION  IN THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF JUSTICE:  POLICE, CORREC-
TIONS,  COURTS  8  (1978)  (authority of superiors  is diminished by civil  service  rules and  police
employee groups).
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of how discretion should be exercised  in the infinitely varying daily circum-
stances  that they  face.8 9  One would  suppose that line  officers in police  de-
partments, prosecutors'  offices, public defenders'  offices, and courts routinely
hold self-images  that emphasize all the good things about discretion.  Organ-
ized  as  a  political  force,  line  officers  will  inevitably  resist  efforts  by  their
superiors to assert control  over the exercise  of their discretion, and  they will
have  cogent  arguments  to  explain  why  that  resistance  serves  the  goals  of
sound public policy.
90
This  perspective  could  have  a  significant  effect  on  many traditional doc-
trines.  For example,  if rules  of criminal  procedure are to be  seen primarily
as  efforts  by  superiors  to  assert  control  over  subordinates,  then  it  might
make sense to distinguish among enforcement  agencies according to the de-
gree  to which such  control  is successfully  asserted.9"  The courts  might en-
force stringent rules of search  and seizure against departments that provided
no training or inadequate training to  their officers,  but might allow depart-
ments with extensive training programs to develop their own rules.  The gen-
eral  idea is  that judicially  developed  standards  are substitutes for internally
developed  ones.  Thus, where the goal  of controlling discretion  is reached by
bureaucratic  superiors pursuing their own goals of asserting power over sub-
ordinates, there  is no  special need  for the internal rules  to be supplemented
by external  ones.
One could play out this approach across the board, or at least as far as any
other approach  allows.  For present purposes, however, it is more important
to explain  why this perspective  may be characterized  as critical.  By empha-
sizing the  role  of rules  of criminal  procedure  as  devices  by  which bureau-
cratic  superiors  attempt  to  assert  their  power  over  subordinates,  the
approach  allows us to rethink the nature of the system of criminal procedure
as  a  whole.  This approach  assumes  that enforcement  agencies  are bureau-
89.  M.  HEUMANN,  supra  note  31,  at 85-86 (defense attorney  explains how  his experience
allows cases  to be disposed  of efficiently),  104 (prosecutor talks  about  the value of his experi-
ence  in  determining  appropriate  sentences),  136  (judge states  that  his experience  helps  him
know  how to sentence defendants).
90.  Id.  at 85  (defense  attorney explains  how  his case  dispositions  "reflect  a pretty good
effort and pretty good results,"  at least from  the standpoint of people  who are  in a position  to
evaluate a disposition); Alschuler, The  Changing Plea Bargain Debate, 69  CALIF.  L. REV.  652,
683  n.83.  (prosecutors  believe  that plea agreements  serve  the public  interest).
91.  We suggest  that  the Supreme  Court  has  actually  endorsed  such  an  approach  in  the
prison  case Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.  678 (1978),  where it  approved limitations on the author-
ity of officials  in a retrograde prison  that, it strongly suggested,  would not have been  imposed
on  officials in a more modern facility.  See generally Tushnet,  The Constitution of the Bureau-
cratic State,  86 W.  VA.  L. REV.  1077  (1984).  Closer to the area  of criminal procedure  itself,
this perspective would  suggest that it might  make sense to rethink  Ker v. California, 374  U.S.
23  (1963),  which adopted  nationwide standards  of criminal  procedure  in  search  cases.
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cracies in which superiors need to control the discretion exercised by subor-
dinates.  It  simply  attempts  to  ascertain  the  implications  of  having
bureaucratic  enforcement agencies handle such important matters as law en-
forcement,  plea bargaining,  and  so  on.  Because  law  enforcement  agencies
are,  after all, just that type of bureaucracy,  this is a perfectly natural  way of
talking  about those  agencies.  However,  since  this  approach brings the  bu-
reaucratic character  of law enforcement  to the surface, it allows us to ques-
tion the  necessity of using  a bureaucracy  to administer justice.
There  are  alternatives  to  bureaucracy.  One  alternative  was  suggested
years ago by John Griffiths in his article  on a "third"  model of the criminal
process,92  distinct  from  Herbert  Packer's  crime  control  and  due  process
models.93  Griffiths  called  his model  the  family  model of criminal  process.
The basic  idea, although  not worked out in  detail in the article,  is  that we
ought to think of the  relations between  enforcement  agents  and the  people
with whom  they interact in the same way we think of the relations between
parents  and children.94  The family model assumes an ultimate reconcilabil-
ity  of interests,95  using punishment  to  express  disapproval  of a particular
action,"  without severing relations with the community by expressing disap-
proval  of the actor.97
Although developing this concept in detail is likely to be tedious, Griffiths'
model suggests the feasibility of a nonrule-based approach to criminal proce-
dure, or at least  a less rule-based approach.  Indeed, when we  tell our chil-
dren that they cannot do something because we have a  rule against it, a  rule
we  may have just invented,  surely  we know  that in some circumstances  we
have  no  rational justification  for  the  prohibition.  Thus,  the  regulation  of
families reveals that, first, rules are usually a second-best method of working
out  problems,  and,  second,  rules  of any  sort  may  be  simple  assertions  of
power.  This second and more general point, that rules may be no more than
assertions  of power,  implies that  the  rules  of criminal  procedure  may  be
designed,  not so much to regulate the exercise of discretion in any particular
way,  but  to  demonstrate  that  superiors  exist  who  have  power  over
subordinates.98
92.  Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A  Third "Model" of the Criminal  Process,
79  YALE L.J. 359 (1970).  See also A.  ROSETr  & D. CRESSEY, supra note 34, at  1758 (describ-
ing a  community-oriented court  system in which group relationships form  the basis  for crime
control).
93.  PACKER,  Two Models of the Criminal  Process, 113  U.  PA. L.  REV.  1 (1964).
94.  Griffiths, supra note 92,  at  371-72.
95,  Id. at  373.
96.  Id.  at 376.
97.  Id. at  379.
98.  See supra text  accompanying  notes  81-89.
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Another cut at this problem can  perhaps bring the concept down to earth,
though  it is  important to  emphasize  that  up to this point  we  have worked
from  the  usual materials of criminal procedure.  There  is a phenomenon  in
today's  society  that is  developing  along  the lines  of Griffiths'  third  model.
This is the growing practice of neighborhood patrols.99  It would be interest-
ing to research how neighborhood  patrols make decisions to investigate  and
control  the  exercise  of discretion  by the participants  in  the program.  One
would expect a fair amount of troubling discrimination in the enforcement of
the  neighborhood  patrol's  law,  although  the  nature of the discrimination,
whether against blacks, long hairs, or any other usually stigmatized  groups,
will vary depending on the neighborhood.  Further, one would also expect a
fairly rich  form  of nonrule-based  control  of discretion  through  essentially
political means  such  as gossip.  One can envision  factions within  the neigh-
borhood, efforts  to  control  members  of the patrol  who  get  out  of line  by
exerting friendly pressure,  and  a variety  of other interesting  devices.  Since
this type  of study  has not been  done, one  can only  speculate  about what a
critical  perspective  could  tell  us  about  political,  rather  than  bureaucratic,
control  of discretion. 00
III.  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS
We have  examined two dimensions of the critical perspective on criminal
procedure, one derived from rule-skepticism  and one derived from fact-skep-
ticism.  Taken  together, these critiques  suggest  that there  is something fun-
damentally askew in our ordinary thinking about law.  The critiques  make it
quite difficult  to view law primarily as  an attempt  to control  police officers,
prosecutors, or potential  criminal defendants.  This article  suggests that the
system of rules of criminal procedure might be viewed in a different way-as
attempts by authoritative  decisionmakers  to express  their conception  of the
world,  rather than as  attempts to improve  the status of the world.
Usually,  we  think  of rules  as  an  effort  to  accomplish  some  social  pur-
poses--controlling  discretion, allocating limited resources  efficiently,  and so
on.  Thurman  Arnold thought  that that was  the wrong  way to think  about
99.  G.  WASHNIS,  CITIZEN  INVOLVEMENT  IN CRIME  PREVENTION  33-56  (1976)  (exist-
ence  of citizen  mobile  patrols  in  Philadelphia;  Chicago;  Compton,  California;  Mobile,  Ala-
bama;  Knoxville, Tennessee;  and  New York); see also A.  ROsETT & D. CRESSEY,  supra note
34.
100.  However,  there  is  a  final  element  of the  research  program  which can  be  suggested.
This element would attempt to compare the ways in  which bureaucratic  control of discretion
has  the incidental effect  of protecting  the  citizenry against  abuse  with  the incidental  protec-
tions afforded  by  the political  control  expected from  neighborhood patrols.  One might  guess
that bureaucratic control reduces discrimination as compared  to political control, but increases
the intrusiveness  of the surveillance.  Again,  though,  that  is  only a guess.
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rules.  To him, rules did not seek to accomplish anything;  they were merely
ways  we  chose  to  express  something  about  our  vision  of society.'  '  That
view  allows  us  to  offer  a  critical  interpretation  of McCarthy v.  United
Statesio 2 and  associated  rules that require certain  disclosures  in open court
before  a guilty plea can be accepted. 103  The superficial view of these rules is
that  they are  designed  to insure  that the  plea is knowing  and voluntary."°
In this respect, the rules support the vision of the criminal process as a mar-
ketplace in which deals are made and honored.  Whether or not that vision is
accurate,  it does indicate the power of a certain way of looking at things in
our society.
There is more to McCarthy than that.  If one speaks with criminal  defense
attorneys  familiar  with  the  plea  process,  they  will  describe  what  happens
before the plea  is taken  as a  rehearsal or run-through,  in which they coach
their clients to learn the right responses to the ritual questions that the judge
is going to ask.I°5  They  see the plea process as a performance,  in which the
point is to produce the right words so that the audience will be satisfied.  On
that view,  taking pleas  is a ritual  reaffirmation  of our commitment  to  con-
tractual,  voluntaristic  ways  of thinking about  social  order  and,  simultane-
ously, to our view  of criminals as dehumanized  objects  who mouth  words
with no meaning.  What is important is that these rituals need have  no con-
nection to reality to be effective.  Indeed, it may be that the more they seem
to touch  reality, the less effective  they  will be as  rituals.
Finally, it is interesting  to note how  the plea-taking procedure looks  to a
judge.  The  Remington  casebook  provides  transcripts  of  three  plea-tak-
ings.106  One clearly  does not comply  with constitutional  requirements,  and
another  is  obviously  a ritual  that  comes  close  to  complying.I 0 7  The  most
interesting is the third, in which the judge actively questions the defendant in
a  genuine  effort  to  find out  whether  the  defendant  understands  the conse-
quences  of the plea.'  What  is most striking about  this  plea-taking  is the
message  one  hears  the  judge  communicating.  It  is  not  so  much  that  the
101.  See T.  ARNOLD,  THE  SYMBOLS  OF  GOVERNMENT  (1935).
102.  394 U.S. 459  (1969).
103.  See FED.  R. CRIM.  P.  11  (requirements  for plea-taking  process).  Easterbrook, supra
note 44,  at 317-18,  treats  rule  11  as a "statute  of frauds."
104.  Boykin v. Alabama,  395 U.S. 238,  243  n.5  (1969).
105.  Cf L. WEINREB,  DENIAL OF  JUSTICE:  CRIMINAL  PROCESS  IN THE  UNITED  STATES
78  (1977)  (plea-taking  is ritual); accord  Alschuler,  The Trial Judge's  Role in  Plea Bargaining,
Part L  76 COLUM.  L.  REV.  1059,  1115 (1976).
106.  Introduction  to Criminal  Procedure  8-54-67  (W.  Dickey,  F. Remington,  &  E.  Cap-
pella  eds.  1980) (available  in  University  of Wisconsin  Law  School  Library).
107.  Id. at  8-54,  8-55.
108.  Id.  at 8-59.
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judge thinks it important that the defendant understands  the procedure;  the
message  that  comes  through  is  that  the judge  is  a  sincere,  warm-hearted
human being, who can now live with himself as he consigns this defendant to
purgatory.  It  is another kind of ritual.